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Summary
Despite possible differences in official ideology the drawbacks of social organization
and the absence of sound approach to social and personal conflicts cause constant
demolition of existing formal institutions for the sake of the survival of the system. The
neglect of these drawbacks brings about old problems to be transferred to the “new”
state. The level of social and human capital and its proper utilization guarantees
progressive development. The shifts in organizational policy is also reflected by the
consequent shift in the theoretical paradigm, from treatment of a participant of the
structure as an object, then as the user and finally as the client. The lack of social capital
generates a vicious cycle, which brings about the necessity of object-based relations and
the spread of all-pervasive protecting informality to compensate for object-based
relations. 
Introduction
The quality of organization can be measured by only the efficiency of production.
Such an approach obscures the wide range of social phenomena which are behind the
curtain of pure economic matters of cost-benefit analysis. Herbert Blumer, one of the
classics of symbolic interactionism expressed this vision of the processes of
industrialization in his book “Industrialization as an Agent of Social Change” (Blumer,
1965). The development of industrial relations is a two-sided process and in order to
understand it in its complexity one has to consider both the influence of local culture on
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community. Social organization, in turn, closely interacts with industrial organization.
Though one can lead to the other, the main share of the responsibility lies on the managers
from both the private and public sector. Emil Durkheim, one of the founders of holistic
sociology that recognizes “social” as the matter independent from the will of people,
nevertheless in the footnote to his “Method of Sociology” exemplified a kind of exclusion
by using the notion “social force” that relates to the feature possessed by bureaucrats
(Durkheim, 1938 [1895]: 145). The distinctive social role of a person with power is
recognized by many other authors. The oriental scripture Bhagavad-Gita contains the
following verse about it: “Whatever action is performed by a great man, common men
follow in his footsteps. And whatever standards he sets by exemplary acts, all the world
pursues” (B.G. 3:21). The tradition of elite research in the modern period dates back to
the writings of Vilfredo Paretto (1968 [1901]). This “social force” or organizational
behavior of the “man of power” is a decisive issue for the proper functioning of the system
of administration both in the private and public sphere. To avoid being dependent on the
personality of “men of power”, a special organizational device called “bureaucracy” was
established. Max Weber studied it and presented results in his renowned works (Weber,
1958). He described the features of the progressive organization, which in his time
achieved supremacy in efficiency over family businesses, clan activities and adhocracies.
Weber’s summary of the main features of the progressive administration, which was
separated from local particularities, became a guideline for implementing it all over the
world. All the following schools of administration concentrated on the drawbacks in the
ideal model of Weber. The Max Weber’s brother, Alfred Weber, also observed
organizations and pointed out the negative phenomena of “split of personality” of the
bureaucrats of his time (Shpakova et al., 2003). The latter day achievements of
organizational science are inspired by the management of culture (Crozier, 1967). At any
rate, successful organizational governance depends to a great extent on the personal
engagement of bureaucrats or managers. No matter how effectively in the short-run the
organization of labor can isolate performance from personality, the time of collusion of
both will come sooner or later. And the first reaction will be within the manager’s staff,
though the most tangible results will become visible by the performance of the ruled,
especially during the survival test of the adversary environment.
It is in the core of survival of any economic policy both on the local and global level,
irrespective of its ideological color, that is clear in the example of Russia. This paper
reviews existing theories of administration from the viewpoint of the inter-temporal shift
of the object-user-client paradigm, showing how participation influences this transition.
Firstly, I demonstrate that the roots of social conflict are in the presence of two
rivaling forces within a human. This conflict manifests itself in the framework of power
related interactions which are also connected with the economic activities of people. And
the main role in this conflict is played by the management of public and private
organizations, which define the pattern of relations in the society. The attempts to isolate
the performance of society from the influence of managers’ behavior and attitudes will
either fail or will bring about high risk of totalitarian rule consolidation if they succeed.
The first close alternative to the relations where an individual becomes an object for
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aware of it. To move beyond the user-based to client based relations where the choices are
openly offered to an individual requires not only awareness but also readiness to
participate in order to employ the revealed possibilities. The lack of awareness and
participation, which are the main elements of social capital, leads the system to the return
to the periodic oscillations between the object based system of bureaucratic administration
and the spread of informality accompanied by nepotism, corruption characteristic to
pre-industrial forms of administration.
1. Honest or Smart. The Origin and Nature of Basic Social Conflict
Nowadays within the humanities, which deal with the wide range of economy related
phenomena, the orthodox approach of economic theory is gradually giving way to more
complicated and interdisciplinary systems of description and explanation. One of most
promising of them is economic sociology of conventions.1 On the other hand, in order to
understand the role of the orthodox approach in the modern development of many
economic disciplines it is necessary to reveal its ideological side, thanks to which
economics survived despite poor explanation and predicting power. The strength of it lies
in the normative foundations which are in the basis of prosperous economic systems,
namely the rationality of law-abiding actors. In other words, what every society badly
needs is “honest and smart people”. Just like many other abstractions used in economic
theory, this basic principle contains a contradictory self-destructing requirement. “To be
honest” in an absolute sense means to be ready to eliminate competitive advantages which
make one better off at the start. “To be smart” entails being able to acquire as many
advantages as possible and use them to obtain even more advantages, thus, following the
logic of an individual, maximizing the bulk of utilities in disposal in unlimited way. This
conflict become especially substantial when the issues of the shadow economy and
corruption come into consideration, which are in turn relevant problems for many
countries including Russia, Poland and other post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. 
One well-known Polish businessmen and statesmen, who was prosecuted for
a corruption-related activity, several years before the case had been a member of scientific
group studying corruption in the framework of the Lech Walesa Institute program. In the
book based on research results, he wrote the following:
The social consciousness has already consolidated the opinion that theft, deceit
and corruption had become the agents of social changes. Indeed, we are building
an economy whose prosperity has to be brought by the “invisible hand of
market”, although the concentration of capital necessary for such a market is
being achieved by means of the “invisible stealing hand (Cwiklinski & Urban,
2006: 1).
Professors often forget to tell students of economics that the “invisible hand of
market” conception emerged in the framework of the wider context of Adam Smith’s
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Another example of the failure of economics to explain phenomena having a direct
reference to the industrial relations is the issue of labor-capital interaction in the economic
theory of factors of production. Here the labor and the capital are described as two equal
factors of production – the statement opposition to which has changed the world.
However, among the equations and formulas of standard textbooks on economics
introducing for instance the notions of ratio of capital to labor, and drawing the linear
model of demand and supply, Samuelson notes that the redistribution of income between
capital and labor as factors of production depends on “local circumstances” or “tradition”.
It is absolutely neglected here that in industrialized countries a lot of people had to
sacrifice personal freedom and sometimes life to change “the tradition”. Hence, in an
economic science there is still a lack of a general consensus on these matters. The lack of
a scientific answer on how the “surplus value” should be shared prevents the labor-capital
consensus and provides the grounds for permanent social conflict. 
By providing two of these examples, I have shown how the social conflict origins
from the inner personality conflict of the choice of “honest or smart”. There are many
readers which would question the universality of the notions, but it would be hard to
refuse their conflict nature. And when comparing both of them the honesty would attract
much more attention than smartness perhaps because many of us have strong excuses of
the harm that we have being directly or indirectly doing to other people. This is because
economic competition first requires the smartness from us. Material prosperity is often
treated as the proxy of it. The Russian ‘noveau riche’ had simple logic – to take advantages
by violating the laws and to use this advantage to obtain even more power so that to
control the labor by using capital. Was that honest? If yes, then the simplicity of this
technique impeaches the smartness of these anecdotic personalities. Knowing it for the
American question: “If you are so smart why are you not that rich?” I have the Russian
answer: “If I were that rich – why would I need to be that smart?” 
2. The Role of the Management in Basic Social Conflict
In the modern world, partly because of the collapse (or breakdown – as some claim)
of the Soviet Union, the conflict between labor and capital has taken the shape of a kind
of Cold War. The growth of prosperity enables individuals to change their side. Joint stock
companies with their shares dispersed among the vast population and state programs of
small business support, socially oriented labor legislation make it more real. To some
extent it is similar to establishing the Geneva Convention, which defines the rules of war
due to the impossibility to outlaw war as it is. Employee share ownership is an effective
tool to reduce basic conflict (Kalmi, 2000), but this and other forms of cooperation are
often offered only for the management. And the management takes the decision about the
necessity to involve lower level employees into the participation on the basis of higher
rank interaction than traditional and bureaucratic execution of the duties. The latter
requires much more interpersonal and communicative skills. 
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relations in developed countries, which despite the tremendous share of government
spending in the GDP are still called ‘capitalist countries’. Another situation is in the ‘new
capitalist countries’, where the degree of negation of labor protecting institutions is
seemingly proportional to their (at least formal) universality in the past. Comparing Russia
and Poland we can see higher labor protection standards in Poland at a lower level of the
shadow economy and corruption. The non-transparency of Russian joint-stock companies
and voluntarism of blocking share holder, as well as built-in tax law violation does not
permit effective influence of employee in the role of shareholder or trade union member
on the enterprise performance, unless one is in the key management position. 
The formula of wild capitalism that is in Russia now, i.e. “Winner takes all” recently
caused the emergence of the new business practice of property redistribution called
“raiding”. The “raiders” are aggressive financial groups often connected with organized
crime circles and engaged in the seizure of enterprises by means of fake documents,
“bought” court decisions and abrupt attacks on the premises (particularly headquarters)
in order to capture control of financial flows. There are cases when “raiders” use brigades
with more than thousand men armed with baseball and iron sticks and chains to eliminate
in non-lethal way the security and to penetrate the target buildings. The employees of
such enterprises are manipulated by the top-management in order to be involved into the
conflict and to let the firm save on security agency. Their interests, nevertheless, will not
be cared about either by the old or by the new raiders’ administration. Medium level
managers are in a vulnerable situation during the attack of the raiders. If they stop working
then they can lose their job if the raiders succeed. If they continue to work they
automatically become betrayers if the raiders fail.
Co-operation as the basis of successful enterprise is in many ways refused in
post-communist societies as the reaction to the enforcement of it by the former power. As
the authors of a book that is the report of many years of research on entrepreneurship in
Poland state: “Under communism, various types of institutions aimed at eliminating (at
the worst) or limiting (at the best) private business activities” (Slomczynski, 2005: 35).
It is a common and simplified view of the winners in the ideological struggle on the
processes that took place under “the communist rule”. The initial sense of the policy was
not to eliminate or limit the initiative as it is but to reorient to the common or public
benefit. However utopian the idea is – it is in the basis of the “economy of participation”,
the difference is in the degree that the private sphere has to be sacrificed for the sake of
the public sphere. What the communist ideology overestimated was the ability of a human
to be zealous enough while working for a public enterprise with the capacity of private
business activity. And the temptation to follow private interest to the detriment of public
interest increased with the rank of an official. Finally the managers in the Soviet Union
formed a quasi-market of the ranks, decisions and other attributes of power which opened
the way to the possession of tangible assets and privileges (Kordonskiy, 2000). Another
important drawback was the overestimation of the equality of the members of society and
the neglect of the scarcity of entrepreneurial resource.
The capital-labor conflict is the particular case of more general conflict between the
ruler and the ruled. Different forms of social participation, ‘social capital’ related activities
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the prophylaxis of the considerable escalation of the conflict and the emergency help for
the victims through the social security system. The socialist or communist paradigm was
supposed to completely eliminate this permanent conflict. However, the result was that
myriads of small, micro and medium conflicts of ‘capitalist’ society were replaced by one
macro conflict – between the state and the citizen. It was expected that after the
concentration of many conflicts into one the latter would be first controlled then
annihilated by means of the merger of the state and the citizen into one. The execution of
the procedure was entrusted to the Soviet bureaucracy. The next section deals with the real
performance of the Soviet bureaucracy that prevented the plan of social transformation
from being realized.
3. Ideal vs. Real Bureaucracy
The rationality of bureaucracy in socialist countries had a peculiar character. It was
rational in the sense that a bureaucrat turned into a “homo economicus” deprived of moral
values since the traditional and religious institutions were suppressed by communist
ideology and the new philosophy was so utopian and irrational that it could not substitute
them in practical matters especially when the ‘honest or smart’ conflict was concerned.
Trotsky wrote about it:
The power in Russia is captured by the bureaucracy. Although everything in the
country belongs to the state, the very state belongs to the bureaucracy.
Sociological problems seem much easier in reality if social phenomena are being
described single-sided. There is nothing more dangerous than not to notice reality
for the sake of logical harmony. The elements of reality violating harmony of
your scheme today, tomorrow will destroy its relevancy completely” (Trotsky,
1967: 249).
Trotsky was right in the sense that the power was kept by the bureaucracy or by
managers, he just did not want to recognize the universality of and necessity for
complicated social systems. His mistake is similar to the mistake of all revolutionaries
which destroy Bastille prisons and then create labor camps on the field, which even
theoretically makes new prisoners’ situation worse than their previous one. The
unprecedented rate of imprisonment and labor encampment with inhuman conditions in
the Soviet Union under the Stalin (Dzugashvilli) regime was incomparable to the
punishments imposed on Russian revolutionaries by the Tsar (Russian Emperor).
Communists built their ideology on depicting the cruelty of autocracy in the textbooks on
history when describing the imprisonment of the participants of the XIX century revolt
of “Dekabrists”. Few historians knew that the first Russian Cooperative was established
in 1831 in Siberia by the Dekabrists – a fact impossible to imagine in, say, Stalin’s
“Gulag” one hundred years later. 
Hence, efficient bureaucracy is a crucial mechanism for implementing ideas. The bad
performance of the mechanism causes temptation for revolutionaries of all kinds to use
unlimited violence to destroy it. However, as Russian history has proven, the unhealed
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officers are transmitted through generations and regimes, and after the regular
“progressive move” bring about the necessity to demolish the whole system as it happened
during the Chinese cultural revolution after decades of communists power.
Thus, the quality of the management that often takes after the patterns of state
administration is the main factor of sustainable development. And for the new Russia the
threats to its integrity and prosperity are the same as those which brought about the
demolition of the communist regime. 
Weber wrote that “Modern bureaucracy in the interest of integrity has developed
a high sense of status honor; without this sense the danger of an awful corruption and
a vulgar philistinism threatens fatally” (Weber, 1958: 88). 
In my opinion, it is not the external signs of the bureaucracy (written documents,
hierarchy, paid service, etc.) that are the key elements of sustainable public or private
administration but the ‘status honor’ of the managers. Without it the pattern of
performance will be similar to those described by Weber for the patrimonial and other
forms of pre-bureaucratic administration. What actually in Russian public and private
administration main is - the absence of ‘status honor’. The cruelty of the natural and social
multicultural environment for the Russian state required rulers to be no less cruel towards
their own people to establish and to defend the state. Civil society institutions could not
be developed in the military state. However, no war consists of battles exclusively, and
during more peaceful times the ruling class tried to compensate for the losses at the
expense of the ruled. The total deprivation of the dignity, culture of prison (10% of the
population had experience of imprisonment during the communist rule) are not the
conditions for emergency ‘status honor’ of ‘honest and smart’ public or private
administration so the people rather rely informal networks. How these informal networks
change the content of bureaucracy and the dynamics of the development of the institutions
will be shown in the next section.
4. From Object to User and the Problem of Awareness
The importance of efficient bureaucracy for the functioning of any complicated social
system is difficult to overestimate. Scientific research on bureaucracy first emerged with
Max Weber’s sociological essays. On the one hand, bureaucracy was treated as an
impersonal mechanism that was designed for transmitting orders from higher to lower
hierarchies, while on the other hand it was to become a kind of bolster to institutionalize
and preserve the legacy of the great ideas which were implemented in the past by
a charismatic personality (Weber, 1947). 
At the beginning of organizational science bureaucracy was established to execute the
action upon the object. The object can be the consumer of the end product as well as an
employee. Successful performance of this system was based on the subordination of the
object to the purposes of the Manager. Alfred Weber, who contemplated the white collar
community of his time, described the shift of the way of life and customs of an individual
involved into industrialization. He, unlike his brother, Max Weber, treated bureaucratiza  -
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with an unnatural form of the realization of personal needs, particularly by means of the
carrier in the structure of bureaucratic organs, which required the dissolution of
personality in the office. The full capacity of this process appears in totalitarian societies
having anti-human objectives in principle. (German Sociology, 2003: 262-275) 
The early success of bureaucracy as a form of administration was based not only on
the technical supremacy of the procedures but also on the possibility to employ lower
social strata in the administrative service. For many of them the appointment was a chance
to go beyond the limits of “debility of rural life”. The new ascriptions in the bureaucratic
machine were the rise in the social structure. Here one could grow further only thanks to
the execution of the orders. However, the perfection of the German bureaucratic machine
was achieved by the time of the Holocaust. The Jewish people murdered in the
concentration camps were not considered as people but only as the objects for the
processing. With perfect rationality the golden crowns of their teeth were collected
separately from their skin, hair, shaving-brushes, foot-wear – as you can see this all in the
Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum in Oswencim, Poland. 
The anti-humanism of this system was also implemented in Stalinist society but the
Russian situation was different than the German on. The revolution caught the Russia off
guard with unfinished industrialization and bureaucratization. The Tsarists’ administration
always depended on non-bureaucratic procedures of autocracy and could not succeed in
creating proper bureaucracy because of the inbuilt controversy between old style nobility
supremacy and the bureaucratic apparatus with employees from the lower social strata.
This situation was beneficial for the revolutionalization of these strata. Most of the early
Russian terrorists of the 19th century were from the strata of professional bureaucracy.
After the demolition of the former power, the Bolsheviks in Russia as well as later the
communists in China had to rely on the existing offices and hired the same employees
(Wang, 2001), but always under the political supervision of party commissioners. The
severe repressions of Stalin prevented corruption by the systematic extermination of the
high ranking bureaucrats, which helped to support the fear but weakened the expertise.
After the death of Stalin nothing preserved the system from the spread of informal
networks. A French researcher of organizations wrote that Russians in the bureaucratic
system have to resort to violating the law in order to execute their obligation towards the
state in response to impossible objectives. As the result, they always have a complex of
being a criminal. Citizens become materially and morally dependent on the central
administration. The only protecting mechanism is to enter into an elementary informal
group, because the relations are distinctively warm and full of care (Crozier, 1967: 232).
The words of Crozier, which referred to the communist times of Russia, are to a great
extent relevant to the present reality of Russian public administration and private business
relations. The upper strata of the administration express aspiration (at least in words) to
stop these relations although thanks to these relations in many cases they obtained their
own positions. 
With the theoretical development of the administrative science, a new Managerial
School emerged, and it was different from classical bureaucratic theory because it paid
more attention to the economic stimulation of an employee. One was still treated as the
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aspirations” by the fact of joining the organization. The school of administration
consolidated bureaucracy and economic theory and is known as classical management or
public choice theory. According to modernization theory, which received some empirical
support from the recently introduced World Value Survey, Russia according to many
indicators of social-economical development is 60 to 80 years behind the developed
countries (Inglehart, Welzel, 2005). In terms of administrative relations, the classical
managerial approach is only under implementation here. The transition to the managerial
approach is marked by changing the role of an employee or end consumer from the object
of the system to the user of the system. User-based relations are characterized by granting
a human more options to choose from, but only if he is interested in them or cares about
them. This includes the whole range of organizational or administrative relations from
the protection of the rights to the freedom of choice. Participation here is no longer limited
by the place in the hierarchy but clustered in the sphere of material interest. 
The next generation of organizational theories is represented by Human Relation
School, which can be considered as an attempt to cope with that range of informal
relations that emerged as the reaction to the implementation of the “object” approach.
Here the behavior is considered in terms of sentiments, personal orientations and values
which are manifested in the participation in informal groups. The formal structure of the
organization is considered as the external variable of the system, which a person functions
in (Barnard, 1938).
Informal relations are the core of Russian industrial and public administration
structure. They penetrate all and the system expels those who are considered as alien to
it. In a recent interview one of the businessmen who functions in the highly profitable
business connected with alcohol production responded to my question about the share of
profits spent by him for informal protection in the following way:
This is the wrong approach, and the Western definition does not fit here. It is an
absolutely different construction when one has personal property that belongs to
him, and then he makes a business out of it and he can share the profit with, say,
racketeers. We have seigniorial relations. Nothing has changed from John the
Terrible’s times, we are still classified as earls and serfs2
After additional questions I understood that most of the luxurious businesses are
controlled by the regional and city public administration officials, who incorporate new
people into the enterprise only on the basis of personal relations. They define part of the
profit that will go to the personal disposal of a participant and de facto are owners of
contributions of the latter. 
The attempts of the government to influence these preindustrial relations do not go
beyond promoting the classical bureaucracy scheme that, in turn, as it was shown above,
is comprehended by the population as detrimental and personally more dangerous than the
informal one. Russians generally know about the possibilities of formal methods of
solving their problems but have no experience with using them (see: Tables 1 and 2).
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of Russians do not see any efficient ways to influence their superiors. Moreover, among
those who know about some methods only less than half actually referred to them,
although among those who referred to them half will use informal ways including illegal
forms.
The formalization of relations by the classic bureaucratic scheme of industrial
relations (if it is successfully implemented) makes an organization vulnerable to the
voluntarism of the one who receives “the captain’s chair”. In the conditions of low
awareness about the rights and possibilities to influence “the captain” the only way of
WSPÓŁCZESNA EKONOMIA Nr 2/2009(10)
84
Ta ble  1.  At  ti  tu  de of Rus  sians to the ef  fi  cien  cy of dif  fe  rent me  thods to im  pact the po  wer
So ur ce:  IK SI  RAN,  Ju ly  2003.
The  ways  of  in flu en cing  the  sta te  ad mi ni stra tion
Con si der  as 
ef fec ti ve  me thods, 
% of the re  spon  dents
Used in the last year, 
% of the re  spon  dents
Stri  ke, ma  ni  fe  sta  tion and other forms of so  cial 
pro te sts  par ti ci pa tion 12.8 3.2
Po li ti cal  par ty  ac ti vi ties  par ti ci pa tion  5.3 1.3
Tra de  union  and  la bor  circ les  par ti ci pa tion 11.4 4.3
Of fi cial  ap pli ca tions  to  sta te  de part ments  and  me dia 18.5 4.2
Use  of  per so nal  con nec tions  19.2 8.2
Co urt  ap pli ca tions  20.1 5.2
Bri bing 10.1 5.5
The  re are no ef  fec  ti  ve ways/did not at  tempt 45.7 77.5
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Me an  for  in for mal  ac ti vi ties 14.65 6.85 49%protection becomes informal relations built according to the patterns of the pre-bureau  -
cratic hierarchy of authorities. This proves that a user-based administrative structure is not
stable and has a transitive character. The question is where it will eventually go if “users”
do not actually use the possibilities which are at their disposal. There are two options – it
will go back to the object-based system or ascend to the client-based system that will be
further discussed.
5. From User to Client. The Problem of Participation
The relations based on classical bureaucracy make an employee and a consumer an
object deprived of free will, and the structure becomes better as it more efficiently
removes personal features inconsistent with the objectives of the system. The management
conception of administration pays more attention to personal needs but only in a limited
way within the range of the economic man’s preferences. Attention to informal relations
in conjunction with a managerial approach brings about user-based relations that are being
implemented in Russia now. However, the user-based system of relations is vulnerable to
the unawareness of users. The implementation of the next stage of client-based relations
in turn is vulnerable to non-participation.
Client-based administrative relations assume that all possible solutions for the client
(employee or end-consumer) are provided beforehand, so he would not have additional,
say, transactional costs on finding information on available options. Hence, the system not
only turn an individual into an object deprived of free will, or even not knowing about the
possibilities, but treats the individual as the client, who is not just given a phantom
perspective of his actions but is provided with a full range of instruments to achieve the
required personal and professional expectations. 
Among the new schools of administrative thoughts representing the client-based
approach the first was the Human Resources (HR) School. It considers individuals as the
sources of hidden reserves. It refers to high-ranking needs in Maslow’s hierarchy. Unlike the
classical management approach, where the decision is transferred top-down, in HR
management the flow of information is redirected, and it has to move then from lower to
higher levels. Here the problem of participation is reflected in the proportion of individuals
willing to be engaged in providing information since there is always the possibility of
misinterpretation, falsification and neglect. The client can finally receive full information but
he/she will not be able to interpret it or will not use the possibility. In the following table the
results of the survey provide evidence that although Russians know about the possibilities
of participating in social life very few of them really wish to do it (See Table 3).
Low participation in social life means low level of social capital – the notion that
came into the scientific lexicon of economics and economic sociology with the evidence
of its explanatory power of the difference in the rates of economic development (Social
Capital, 2000). This and other peculiarities of Russian society are similar to many other
societies of the developing countries, which is the reason why some researchers that
believe in the dichotomy of collectivists and individualistic economies assign Russia to
collectivists and reject the applicability of the conventional approach (Kirdina, 2004). 
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reveals social-psychological constructions and basic elements similar to those of Western
societies. Thus, the issue in question is how to distil and combine them to acquire the
composition necessary for sustainable development (Boguslavskiy, 2005). And here we
approach the concerns of the neo-rational, cultural or “complex” school of administration. 
According to this school, members of an organization are involved in the complex and
dynamic socio-political system, in which the satisfaction of an individual and his/her
social needs are realized in the context of power relations. This school to some extent
competes with but also complements HR approach. Here we are dealing with the
culture-management. The success of it depends on suiting the purposes of the organization
to the culture of society the way to achieve economic parameters and be aware of the
impact of the organizational relations on the general culture. 
Hence, the growth of social capital has crucial importance and is connected with the
transition to client-based organizational relationships. The lack of social capital brings
about the threat of returning back to the object-based administrative relationships
characterized by depriving individuals even of the rights given to them by the user-based
system. Classical bureaucracy can be an effective mechanism for creating social order, but
from being familiar with the Holocaust one has to think about the long term price that the
society has to pay if it refuses to spend much time and effort into changing the culture. 
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Ta ble  3.  The  po ten tial  of  Rus sian  re spon dent’s  par ti ci pa tion  in  so cial  li fe
So ur ce:  Ibi dem.
Par ti ci pa ted 
(%) The  form  of  par ti ci pa tion Re ady  to 
par ti ci pa te  (%)
23.4 Col lec ti ve  ac com pli sh ment  of  com mon ly  used  in fra struc tu re 
(ho uses,  play gro unds,  etc.)  43.8
10.0 Tar ge ted  lo cal  ac tions  par ti ci pa tion 16.4
3.8 Self -go vern ment  par ti ci pa tion 6.5
10.2 Hu ma ni ta rian  re lief  col lec tion  27.9
9.0 Elec tion  com pa nies  par ti ci pa tion 8.9
5.9 La bor  circ les  par ti ci pa tion 9.1
2.8 Me eting  and  tra de  union  stri kes  par ti ci pa tion  4.4
2.7 Cha ri ty,  NGO,  re me dial  ac tions  and  other  funds  par ti ci pa tion 10.2
1.0 Lo cal  po li ti cal  par ty  par ti ci pa tion 1.9
1.8 Re li gio us  or ga ni za tions  par ti ci pa tion 2
0.6 Others  kinds  of  par ti ci pa tion 0.5
58.3 Didn’t do any \\\ I’m not go  ing to! 37.5Conclusions
The neglect with which classical economics treats the distinctive character of labour
as a factor of production caused the inability to explain important social phenomena. The
labour-capital conflict is the private case of more general conflict of the rulers and the
ruled. The social conflict itself is rooted in the inner conflict of the choice between
self-oriented and socially-oriented behaviour. The most important consequences of the
inner conflict dwell within the minds of the elite or managers or rulers. Both capitalist and
socialist political economy are dependent on the rate and proper organization of human
participation in creative activity. The responsibility for the involvement of the population
in creative activities lies with the elite. The inability to do it brings about the decision to
demolish the present system, but the new one will have to face the same problems.
Regular collapses are guaranteed. The key element in any structured social relations is the
treatment of the participants. The increase of social and human capital in the developed
world caused a gradual shift of the paradigm of the organizational thought. There was
consequent shift from the treatment of an individual: from being an object, deprived of
choice, to a user who has the choices but is not given information about it, and finally to
client, provided with all instruments of choice in advance. The user-based system is not
stable and has a transitive character since it depends on the awareness of a user who has
considerable transaction costs in obtaining information about the choices. The question
is where it will eventually come if “users” do not actually use the possibilities, which are
in their disposal, there are two options – it will come back to object-based system or
ascend to the client-based one. The level of social capital has crucial importance for
transition to client-based relationships, the lack of it as it is in Russia brings about threat
of returning back to object based administrative relationships, characterized by the
deprivation of individuals even of the rights given them in the user-based system. The
bureaucratic system is the best solution then, though it is always vulnerable to and
challenged by informal relations, corruption, nepotism, etc. 
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88Czynniki społeczne idziałania elit wograniczaniu rozwoju
organizacyjnego
Streszczenie
Różnice w stosowanych koncepcjach organizacji społecznej i zróżnicowanie
uwzględniania w nich podejścia do konfliktów społecznych powodują stałe zaburzenia
istniejących instytucji formalnych. Zaniedbanie tych niedociągnięć utrzymuje stare
problemy w nowych rozwiązaniach. Poziom rozwoju kapitału społecznego oraz ludzkiego
oraz jego właściwe wykorzystanie gwarantuje postęp i rozwój. Przesunięcia w polityce
organizacyjnej spowodują logiczne przesunięcie w teoretycznym paradygmacie: odejścia
od traktowania uczestnika struktury jako przedmiotu, a traktowania go jako użytkownika
i w końcu jako klienta organizacji. Brak kapitału społecznego i jego niewłaściwe
wykorzystanie tworzy grupy nieformalne (elity) oraz generuje niewłaściwy cykl rozwoju
organizacji i zakłóca nawiązywanie przez nią różnych relacji.
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